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Abstract 
 
The prevalence of food quality standards in international trade is constantly increasing and 
has a growing influence on developing countries. A wide range of literature in development 
economics focused on the determinants of the standard adoption and on the debate of whether 
international standards exclude small-scale farmers from high-value food markets. Otherwise, 
when exclusion is pointed out, very little is said on how problematic such forms of exclusion 
are. In this paper, we examine which behaviors small-scale farmers adopt face to the 
incontrovertible standards, what happens to the farmers that are excluded from a specific 
certified market, and to what extent small farmers are affected to not be certified. Based on an 
analysis of primary data collected to examine the implication of GlobalGap on the mango 
sector in Peru, we consider three main options for the small-scale farmers: “loyalty” 
(implementation of the standard under specific conditions), “switch” of market segment, and 
“exit” from the market. The last option leads farmers to sell all their production to small and 
volatile exporters, called golondrinos (swallows). We show empirically that some small-scale 
farmers (8% of the sample) comply with GlobalGap standard thanks to the support from 
exporters (farming contrats which include the certification cost), while others switch of 
market segment by complying with the organic certification (12,5%). Organic certification 
substitutes for the GlobalGap requirement in the EU market. Finally, we find a significant 
level of exit option (24%), especially among smaller farms, less specialized, and furthest from 
exporter plants. The latter seem very affected by the changes related to the GlobalGap 
standard requirements: price risk on their production has increased and their bargaining power 
and agricultural income have decreased. They are particularly vulnerable because their level 
of investment (mango trees) impedes to radically change of farm activity. 
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades witnessed unprecedented changes in the agro-food sector through the 
proliferation of standards in international agricultural trade. After a period during which the 
states of developed countries actively implemented food safety standards (this has been 
exacerbated by a series of food scandals (Henson and Caswell, 1999)), voluntary standards 
emerging from the private sector have been developed to attend to rising consumer concerns 
regarding the conditions of production and trade of the goods they buy (Jaffee and Henson, 
2004). These voluntary standards combine a mixture of food safety, environmental, and social 
dimensions, while an inherent emphasis is being given to product traceability. Consequently, 
standards not only affect the safety of final products, but also the whole organization of the 
supply chain (Hammoudi et al., 2009). For many farmers in developing countries, investing in 
agricultural niches for exportation may appear as a profitable option. However, a wide range 
of empirical literature dealing with the impact of rising international standards in developing 
countries so far has been to show that the stringent conditions tend to lead to the exclusion of 
smallholders and the inclusion of larger farmers (Augier et al., 2005; Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000; Escobal et al., 2000; Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 2003; VanDerMeer, 2006). 
Lack of access to human, physical, and social capital and the costs of certification are the 
most common factors explaining the non-compliance of smallholders with standards (Busch 
and Bain, 2004; Vorley and Fox, 2004). On the contrary, some less pessimistic studies find 
positive effects on very small farms, which are included in the high-standard market through a 
contract-basis with the agro-exporters (Asfaw et al., 2010; Chemnitz, 2007a; Chemnitz et al., 
2007b; Henson et al., 2011; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al., 2009).   
In fact, standards affect all producers differently, depending on the nature of the standard 
as well as the institutional environment of the country and the characteristics of farms 
(Chemnitz et al., 2007b).  However, very little literature examines what happens to the 
farmers that are excluded from a specific certified market and to what extent small farmers are 
affected to not be certified. Therefore, when there is some empirical evidence of exclusion of 
small farmers from high-standard market, very little is said on how problematic such form of 
exclusion are (Chemnitz et al, 2007b). Moreover, exclusion from the market requiring 
standards may not necessarily be problematic, depending on the alternative options (market, 
employment opportunities...) for farmers (Belton et al., 2011). One would expect that these 
farmers shift in final market but we know little about income effect, marketing risk, and labor 
market effects of these excluded farmers. Our paper is a contribution to the scarce literature 
analyzing the implications that international sustainability standards have on the behavior of 
small-scale farmers and their impacts in terms of marketing risks and income levels.  
In this paper, we focus on small-scale producers of fresh mangos in Peru. The fresh mango 
sector in Peru is an interesting case, as public standard and growing private standard 
requirements in international mango trade are seen as threat to export for a significant part of 
small-scale mango producers. In particular, the private GlobalGap standard– the most 
important standard that applies to production of fresh mangos – has become quasi-mandatory 
for exportation to the European Union (EU) since 2007. Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) have 
studied the adoption of the GlobalGap standard in the mango export sector in Peru in 2004-
2005. However, they didn’t explore the implications for smallholders. Yet the new context 
raises the question of the manner in which Peruvian small-scale farmers respond to this new 
predominant standard. The concern is also interesting in Peru as mangos are exported both to 
the UE and the United States (US), allowing combination or substitution between theses both 
largest consumption markets, according to the type of standard required. 
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Drawing on an adaptation of Hirschman’s (1970) conceptual framework – also used by 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) on the food safety standard’s impact – we consider three main 
options for mango growers in Peru: “loyalty” (implementation of the standard), “switch” of 
market segment, and “exit” from the market. We first held some qualitative interviews with 
experts and supply chain actors before implementing a quantitative approach aimed at 
identifying the producers’ characteristics for each alternative option. Surveys were conducted 
with 223 small-scale mango producers from October 2010 to May 2011. Data was collected in 
the region of Piura, the main zone of mango production.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a background of mango production and 
trade in Peru and the evolving international trade towards standards; section 3 develops the 
analytical framework used to formulate hypotheses; section 4 describes the survey and data; 
section 5 presents and discusses the empirical findings; and section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Fresh mango sector in Peru  
 
a) Production and Trade 
According to the World Bank definition, Peru is a low middle income country with GDP of 
USD 152.8 billion and per capita income of USD 9200 in 2010(Worldfactbook, 2010). In 
Peru, agriculture is still a source of economic development. It accounts for 8% of the GDP 
and provides 23% of direct and indirect employment (INEI, 2008). Contrary to numerous 
exported agricultural products, mango production in Peru is also locally consumed. Since 
1985 with the first export towards US, the sector has grown at remarkable rates (figure 1). 
Between 2000 and 2010, the cultivated areas passed from nearly 18 700 of hectares to around 
28 400 of hectares and the production from 125 thousand tons to 250 thousand tons (MINAG, 
2010). Peru exports around 30% of its national production (105,724 tons in 2009/2010) and is 
the fifth largest mango exporter in the world. Fresh mangos are by far the most important of 
exported mangos (87% of exported mango volumes in 2009, according to customs). Exports 
go to both the EU (65%) and US (35%) markets but it is only since 2006 that the EU has 
surpassed the US as main destination market (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2) (Gerbaud, 2010).  
 
Figure 1: figures of mango sector in Peru 
 
 
Source: data from MINAG and PROMPERU 
 
Production is concentrated in northern Peru, in the region of Piura (around 70% of the 
national production and 90% of exported production). The main mango varieties grown for 
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the domestic market are the local variety, Criollo, and the improved variety, Edward. 
Nevertheless, their productions have declined. Improved varieties for export such as Kent 
(94,5% of export volume), Tommy Atkins (3,7%), a few Haden (0,7%) and the new late 
variety Keitt (0,75%) have replaced steadily the domestic ones (SENASA, 2010). Piura 
export-oriented production is harvested between November and March. The export window is 
linked to the targeted market, to the competition among countries and to the period of 
harvesting for each producing regions in Peru (table 1 and table 2). For the EU market, Peru – 
the second largest supplier – competes with Brazil in November and December. For the US 
market, Peru – the third largest supplier – competes with Ecuador in December and January 
(Gerbaud, 2010).  
 
Table 1: mango supply schedule in EU according to the main country suppliers 
 J F M A M J J A S O N D 
Peru                Kent                         
Brazil      Tommy Atkins 
                       Kent 
                        
                        
Ouest Africa   Kent 
                       Keitt 
                        
                        
Senegal           Kent                         
Israel      Tommy Atkins 
                        Kent 
                        Keitt 
                        
                        
                        
Spain              Osteen 
                        Kent 
                        
                        
Source: adapted from Gerbaud, 2010 
 
Table 2: mango supply schedule in US according to the main country suppliers 
 J F M A M J J A S O N D 
Peru                                         
Brazil                               
Ecuator                         
Mexico                         
Source: adapted from Gerbaud, 2010 
 
The figure 2 shows that the Free On Board price (FOB, price at the exporting port) for 
exported Kent mangos is substantially higher than the price for mangos sold on the national 
market. The monthly FOB prices for exportation to the US and to the EU are nearly similar 
for both markets (Appendix 3). Nevertheless, there are some monthly or annual variations due 
to the other competitors for the targeted market (for instance UE market price was higher than 
US price in November 2010 because of the shortage of Brazilian mangoes on the international 
market, that was not the case in November 2009 (Fruitrop, 2010)). International market is 
lucrative since prices are generally superior to national price and because government 
supports exporters by refunding 5% of the FOB value for duties paid on imported inputs. 
 Otherwise, prices for Edward or Criollo varieties are substantially higher than those for 
the Kent variety on the domestic market, as Peruvian consumers do not value the taste of the 
latter. The domestic market alternative for Kent mangos is thus not profitable.  
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Figure 2: Mango prices according to varieties and targeted market (in euro/ton). 
 
Source: according to the data from MINAG, 2011. 
 
 
b) Access to the market 
For the domestic market, producers generally sell their mango production though brokers 
who supply the market of Lima. Most producers have informal contracts with their broker 
where price is flexible and depends on the final demand price. These middlemen deduct a 
commission (around 10%) of the sale price (AVSF, 2008). These types of transactions require 
long-term relationships and confidence between the producer and the broker (AVSF, 2008). 
For the export market, the first constraint to accessing an outside market is related to the 
minimum volume required by the buyer (at least one container, i.e. 20 tons). This explains 
why small-scale producers (on average hardly producing 20 exportable tons) have to form an 
association in order to get export market access.  
The second constraint is that the mango exporters must meet some commercial quality 
requirements: color (red), appearance (no scratches) and size (at least 450 g).  
Transport is generally offer by exporter trucks to farmers after the former organized the 
harvest. There are 3 ports of the region of Piura: Paita, Talara and Bayovar. Fruits are 
generally transported by maritime routes - 90% of transport use boat (SENASA, 2010). The 
roads from the packing houses to the ports are well-maintained. The major problem is linked 
poor logistic and services in the port while the relative costs are very high. Scarcity of space 
in the ships caused delays and, in many cases, a large quantity of fruit became overripe and 
had to be discarded –knowing that shipping times to US is 14 days long and to Europe 21 
days long. For the shipment, exporters are used to deal with transporters with a bill of landing 
(the transporter take temporarily the ownership of the products). Cargo carriers are only 
responsible for damages due to technical problem on boat but never damages due to fruits 
themselves.  
For exporters, it is more difficult to find buyers and keep commercial relationship in EU 
than in US because it is further. Moreover, exporters can hardly move to UE when they want 
to check if buyers are cheating when they deduct penalty for bad quality. They are thus used 
to work with more than two buyers per area to control cheating behaviors and improve 
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bargaining power. They have generally not fixed quantity commitments over the season and 
they are paid the going market price. Importers deduct a commission from 8 to 10% on the 
final price. They generally paid sixty days later.  
Lastly, although it doesn’t exist any compulsory Peruvian public norms on good practical 
practices for mango production for domestic market1, export-oriented producers require a 
phytosanitary certificate (the annual cost is USD 7/ha/year) from the SENASA (Servicio 
Nacional de Sanidad Agraria del Peru) – the public agency in charge of inspection, control, 
and eradication of the fruit fly2. 
 
c) Non-tariff measures and constraints from the US and EU markets 
For both the US and EU markets, exports are required to respect the Codex Alimentarius 
and maximum pesticide residual levels (MRL). Nevertheless, some differences exist between 
the market requirements: the major constraint from the US market is a public norm while 
from EU it is a private standard. 
 
US mango regulation depends from two institutions: APHIS-USDA (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) which ensures the health and care 
of animals and plants in US and FDA (Food and Drug administration) which is in charge to 
protect and promote public health through the regulation and supervision of food safety.  
First at all, APHIS decides of the positive list of the authorized fruits and vegetables export 
by country, and determine the requirements for their importation into the United States (this is 
listed in the Fruits and Vegetables Import Requirements database (FAVIR)). APHIS is in 
charge to write out emergency pest notifications to alert users if there is a change in the 
import status of a commodity or country and get the right to issue marketing orders to protect 
American agriculture. According to this process, before 1997, Peru couldn’t export mangoes 
to US, and there is only 4 years, that it could export citrus, and one year for avocado.  
 
The most demanding norm for exportation to the US relates to a public norm: a 
hydrothermal treatment is required to kill fruit flies; the mangos undergo a hot water 
treatment in a certified processing plant3. For this, the APHIS-USDA (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) allocates personnel to each 
treatment plant so as to monitor the hydrothermal process during the fresh mango season 
(calibration of the hot water tanks and the length of immersion)4. The high costs of initial 
                                                 
1
 Nevertheless, APEM supported by BID, has develop in 2007 a manual to promote voluntary good practical 
practices in mango. 
2
 However, according to this organization, inspections are partially hampered due to the lack of performing 
computers, lack of vehicles for inspection, lack of employees to reply at the simultaneous producer demand and 
to control plants. Finally this year, they face problems with stamp seals which were illegible or too breakable. At 
the producer and exporter side, SENASA report 2010 relates problems encountered during inspection which 
often lead to not deliver certificate or to reject products: 1) at the farm level, it is still common that the juridical 
forms are not updated; besides, fruits infected with fruit fly larvae due to a misuse of traps have been refused 2) 
at the plant level, detection of larvae have leaded to refuse the whole lot; presence of crickets have also leaded to 
close a plant for 2 days 3) at the shipping level, containers are sometimes dirty or foul-smelling and detection of 
insects could lead to refuse the whole container. 
3
 Chile, Argentina, China and Japan require also hydrothermal immersion treatment. 
4
 According to the SENASA report, in 2009-2010, 104 lots have been rejected for presence of fruit fly larvae. 4 
lots have been rejected for problem of treatment temperature not high enough or because fruits are too big to 
undergo treatments. There are problems in plants linked to dirty treatment water or to technical failures (valves 
of solenoid, switch…). Moreover, according to Sivapalasingam et al., (2003) it appeared that the process of hot 
water treatment, preventing exportation of fruit fly, is a possible point of contamination with human pathogens 
such as salmonella Sivapalasingam et al, 2003. A Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella enterica Serotype Newport 
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investment in certified plants and treatment supervision are charged by the exporters5, which 
explains why there are so few treatment plants in Peru: there are nine certified treatment 
plants, but only six are working (two in the Sullana area and four in the Tombogrande area) 
(table 3). According to our interviews, the major constraint for the exporters who do not own 
a treatment plant, is the waste created due to long waiting times to access treatment plant (this 
could reach from 10 to 15% of the whole volume). Moreover, FDA (Food and Drug 
administration) – the US public agency in charge to protect and promote public health through 
the regulation and supervision of food safety - requires numerous administrative forms 
(exporter registration, representative in US, traceability registers…)6. Otherwise, the US 
private standards required by importers are most frequently specific to manufacturing or 
processing plants: the GMP (good manufacturing practices), the BASC (certified good 
handling and shipping practices) but also the BRC (British Retailers Consortium). Concerning 
production, the most widespread private standards in mango production are those for organic 
certification.  
 
Table 3: evolution of the number of packing plants and treatment plants in Peru 
 Packing plants Treatment plants 
2007 15 7 
2008 20 8 
2009 19 7 
2010 20 6 
Source: SENASA, 2010 
 
In Europe, mango regulation depends of the DG Health and Consumer Protection at the 
European level which ensures a high level of protection of human health and consumers' 
interests in relation to food. Border controls are carried out by member states. 
Contrary to US, Europe decides of a negative list of non-authorized fruits and vegetables 
export by country. Therefore, EU authorized more imported products than US. Import 
requirement are also much less exigent than US and consist in Codex alimentarius and respect 
of the maximum pesticide and agrochemical residual levels. However, when a serious 
problem occurs in a commodity from one specific country (microbiological pathogen for 
example), UE impede all the commodity products of this country to be exported in the Union 
– while US sanction in this case concerns only the exporter who has defaulted7.   
                                                                                                                                                        
Infection Linked to Mango Consumption: Impact of Water-Dip Disinfestation Technology. Clinical Infectuous 
Diseases, 37, 1585-1590.. 
5
 we didn’t find the cost to established a treatment plant but the salary for the APHIS inspector is around USD 
300/hour; Fulponi (2007) gave the total price of 50 000 USD $ per season.; costs for outsourced services is from 
0.1 to 0.125 USD $/kg for packing and from 0.15 to 0.16 USD $/kg for treatment. 
6
 According to the FDA import refusal report from 2004, fruits represent 12% of the import violations at the US. 
The most common violation for fruits is due to « filthy » (22%) and the second one is « pesticides » problem 
(11%). “Misbranding” problem is still a important problem too. Nevertheless, according to the FDA database, 
which gives only very recent data (April 2009 to March 2010), there was no border rejections for fruits from 
Peru this last year. 
7
 According to the RASFF report of 2008, fruits and vegetables represent 14% of the border rejection in EU. The 
most common violation for fruits and vegetables is due to « pesticides» problem (33% at the total, 50% from 
Peru) and the second one is « microbiologic contamination» problem (23% at the total, 25% from Peru). 
“Misbranding” does not appear a problem in the EU case. The RASFF database, which gives data from 1997 to 
2010, shows that there is only 1 border rejection in 13 years for mangos from Peru. The rejection happens in 
2010 by Spain and was caused by problem on “organoleptic aspects”. Others rejections from Peru concern 
pesticides on fresh grapes (3 rejections) on strawberries (2 rejections) and insect on pepper (1 rejection). 
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Contrary to the US, Europe does not require hydrothermal treatments. Mangos exported to 
Europe are cleaned and then packed in 20 existing packing plants in Peru (table 3). Most of 
them are also located in the Sullana and Tombogrande areas. Beyond the Codex Alimentarius 
and the MLR, barriers to trade in the EU are therefore much more relative to private 
standards: at the plant level, the HACCP is essential; at the production level, GlobalGap has 
been becoming almost mandatory since 2007, and organic certification has spread. 
 
Nowadays, there is an strong competition among approved certification bodies in Peru (the 
principals are NSF, SGS Control Union, Biolatina) revealing the growing demand to certified 
production.   
 
Finally, Peruvian exporters comply with public norms from US and EU. Major constraints 
nowadays tend to come from the proliferation of private standards (GlobalGap, USGap, 
Organic, Tesco’s Nature’s Choice, Field to Fork, Fair trade, LEAF, SQF 1000, HACCP, 
BRC, BACS, ISO 22000…) each time different in terms of code of practices, registration and 
traceability forms. 
  
d) Export-oriented organizations and stakeholders 
In Peru, about 28,400 ha are cultivated for mango production, 70% of which are located in 
the Piura region. Most of the producers are small or very smallholders (i.e. 85% of them have 
less than 20 ha of total land including 15% who have less than 5 ha). This repartition and the 
rather small size of mango producers in Peru are due to the agrarian reform of 1969.  
 
In 2009, 1,627 producers received phytosanitary certificates from the SENASA and were 
thus allowed to export their mangos. Among these producers, 75% are smallholders (less than 
20 ha of total land), 20% are medium farmers (from 20 to 50 ha), and 5% are large-scale 
farmers (more than 50 ha). They account for 30%, 30%, and 40% of exported produce, 
respectively. Larger farmers are generally vertically integrated into exporter enterprises and 
thus export their own mango production. However, there is large variability in mango 
production from year to year8. Thus, these exporters generally complete they own production 
by purchasing from smaller farmers. Suzuki et al. (2011) also note, in their case study on 
pineapple exporters in Ghana, that this strategy is undertaken, at least in part, to shift quantity 
risks (Suzuki et al., 2011). Small-scale producers may thus have annual contracts (written or 
oral contracts, but hardly enforceable). Through these contracts, they steadily delegate 
harvests to the exporter (or a third party assigned to harvest on behalf of the packing plant), 
since it becomes very difficult to gather daily workers. In addition, in many cases, producers 
hardly have any access to credit to pay workers. A disadvantage of that service is the high 
level of mangos discarded during the harvest – the discarded mango rate is on average 20%. 
Exporters are also in charge of carrying out transportation to the processing plant. Prices are 
rarely fixed and pay is often delayed. Nonetheless, for a monthly adjustment strategy, 
exporters do not implement farming contracts with smallholders. 
 
In 2009-2010, there were 106 fresh mango-exporting companies (SENASA, 2010). While 
the production is highly atomized, there is a rather medium concentration of exports in few 
exporting companies: the top 10 represent 46,8% of the total export volume (Table 4). 
However, when compared to the figures from 2005-2006 (Fulponi, 2007), this concentration 
                                                 
8
 For example, the 2008-2009 season was disastrous in terms of production (due to agronomic reasons). 
Numerous producers mention a reduction of around 50% of their production level. 
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in the mango-exporting sector has decreased these last five years, revealing a still very 
attractive and expandable market: in 2005 there were around 70 mango exporters in Peru and 
the top 6 represented 54%; Moreover the top 1 accounted in 2006 for 22.1% of the total fresh 
mango export and in 2010 only for 10.2%. Otherwise, there are still few foreign exporter 
enterprises (it seems there are only two for the moment) but since the sector has been 
attractive for foreign investments few years ago, we found Peruvian enterprises with a part of 
foreign capital (from US, Colombia, Costa Rica…).  
 
Table 4: Top 10 fresh mango exporting companies of Peru in 2009-2010 
companies plant 
aggregated 
percentage percentage 
net weight 
(tons) 
Sunshine packing treatment 10,2 % 10,2 % 10737 
Camposol packing treatment 17,7 % 7,5 % 7970 
FLP del Peru packing   23,2 % 5,5 % 5867 
Empafrut packing treatment 27,9 % 4,6 % 4883 
Peru frut. Trop. packing   32,0 % 4,1 % 4370 
Dominus     35,1 % 3,1 % 3330 
Agricola Mochica     38,3 % 3,1 % 3317 
SA frontera del Peru     41,2 % 2,9 % 3060 
Agroindus. Solcace 
SAC     44,0 % 2,8 % 2960 
M&C fruit SAC     46,8 % 2,8 % 2946 
Other     100,0 % 53,2 % 56284 
Total     100 % 100 % 105724 
Source : established according to the data from SENASA, 2010. 
 
Furthermore, regarding the repartition of export companies according to their volume 
(figure 3), the sector shows a relatively low entry barrier for small exporting companies. 
Therefore, the sector actors complain about the high number of small and very volatile 
exporter firms (60% treat less than 500 tons per year) that enter the market for short run 
market opportunities (they also change of name each time they enter the market). These 
sporadic exporters are called “golondrinos” (meaning “swallows”). These firms affect the 
market by increasing rapidly the offer and thus decreasing the Peruvian exporting price. They 
are also subjected to the most border rejections, which have effect on the country’s reputation 
on the international trade.  
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Figure 3: Fresh mango exporting companies repartition according to volume sold in 
2009-2010 
 
 
Source : established according to the data from SENASA, 2010. 
 
 
According to our interviews and secondary data, we identify 4 types of exporters in Peru 
(Appendix 4): 
 
(i) Exporters that rely on their own production (more than 100 ha) and who get their own 
packing and treatment plant. While they were used to complete their production by purchase 
to others producers, nowadays they tend to be more vertical integrate to easily enforce quality, 
traceability and certified production in particular GlobalGap. They still supply themselves by 
medium producers who have ability to implement these standards. They have sold more than 
3500 tons in 2009-2010. Sometimes they provide processing services for other firms. They 
often diversify their product offers (grape, avocado, citrus, banana, pineapple) since the plant 
couldn’t be profitable with the only 3-month-mango-production. These exporters are clearly 
the older in the sector (established between 1991 and 2001).  
(ii) Exporters that rely on their own production but who don’t have packing house. Their 
farm size varies from 50 to 250 ha and volume they have sold from 600 tons to 3300 tons in 
2009-2010. They have implemented GlobalGap and sometimes organic standard. Again, they 
can easily enforce better agricultural practices since they have vertically integrated 
production. They subcontract for the packing and treatment process. Some of them complain 
with the difficult access to the plant. Sometimes they sell part of their products to large 
exporters because they lack of contact to export their whole production or to secure a 
minimum price with fixed-price-contract. They have been established more recently than the 
first ones (from 2003 to 2007) 
(iii) Exporters who are not producer but who get their packing and treatment plant. They 
buy 65 to 75% of their volume (often certified GlobalGap) to medium producers and 35 to 
25% of their volume (sometimes certified organic) to small producers (individually or from 
producers’ group). They clearly prefer to work with larger producers to decrease logistic and 
control costs. They manage the harvest in the farmer field, carry out the transport, process 
products and commercialized. They have been established between 2003 and 2007. 
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(iv) Exporters who are not producer and who don’t get any plant. They are the more 
volatile exporters and generally focused on punctual volume (<100 tons a year) more than on 
quality. 
Interviews with mango exporters also revealed that they would like to increase the 
production of mangoes on their own lands, obviously outside the contract system but land is 
very expensive nowadays. Escobal et al. (2000) found the same dynamic in the asparagus 
industry in Peru ten years ago. 
 
Mango producing sector is few organized in Peru. According to an expert, this could be 
explain by the fact that there are a lots of small producers and mango season is very short, 
around 3 months (compare to the bananas sector which also involved a high number of small 
producers, bananas production organizations is easier to rise by the fact that bananas are 
produced all along the year). Nevertheless, since 2002, medium size producers tend to 
organize themselves in association, named PROMANGO (Asociación de medium and grande 
productores de mango del Peru). The association account for 30 producers with an average 
size of 30 ha (but farm sizes vary from around 10 ha to 500 ha). They gather around 1500 ha 
at the total and represent 30% of the total national production. 95% of its members already get 
Globalgap certifications and 2 members have Tesco’s Nature’s Choice’s certification. 
PROMANGO is trying hard to market itself member’s production but this year, only 12 
members has really gather their production and export (that represent only 5 % of the 
volume).  
 
At the exporters’side, there are, on the other hand, several organizations: 
(i) ADEX (Asociación De los EXportadores del Peru) was established in 1973 and 
accounts for 143 members (exporters, importers and service providers for international trade). 
ADEX is the biggest lobby for exporters since it has strong connections with the public 
authorities (PROMPERU and SENASA)  
(ii) AGAP (Asociación de Gremios Agroexportadores del Peru) was established in 2003 
and accounts for 500 members of whom 300 are fresh product growers (mango, avocado, 
grape). Members are gathering in commodity unions which represent around 80% of the total 
exported volume by commodity. AGAP is specialized in agroexportation and thus claim to be 
more relevant to negociate with political authorities.  
(iii) Among AGAP unions, APEM (Asociación Peruana de Exportadores de Mango) is 
specialized on mango industry. The association has been established in 2000, accounts for 19 
members and represents 60% of the mango exported volume. For 6 months, PROMANGO 
has become member too. One of the strengths of the association is based on the leadership to 
open international markets, as in the case of the US, China and now, Japan.  
(iv) APROMALPI (Asociación de Pequenos Productores de Mango de Alto Piura) has 
been created in 1996 in Chulucanas (Region of Piura) with 40 initial members to sell mango 
at the national level. Since the beginning, they received help from the NGO PEDICAFE. In 
2003, they started to export and get the certification Fair trade by FLO, then in 2005, the 
organic certification. The association gets a loan from Rabobank thanks to contracts with 
European buyers. 
 
At the institutional level, two public agencies are working for mango exports in Peru: 
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(i) PROMPERU is the export promotion agency of the Ministry of External Trade and 
Tourism (MINCEUR). This agency provides support to the sector by sponsoring workshop 
and developing guidelines and recommendations to help exporters in complying international 
regulations.  
(ii)  SENASA (Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agraria del Peru) is a public agency of 
Ministry or Agriculture, in charge of phytosanitary and zoosanitary surveillance and control 
system. It is responsible for inspection and delivery of phytosanitary certificates required to 
export products from Peru. 
 
e) International standard schemes for fresh mangos 
According to Chemnitz et al., (2007b), the nature of the standard (i.e. annual cost of 
compliance but also type of capital required) may affect producers differently.  
 
The GlobalGap guideline ensures good agricultural practices focusing first on food-safety, 
but also a number of issues concerning environment quality (soil, water and wildlife 
conservation), worker safety and hygiene, and traceability on the farm. The certificate 
includes some initial investments (such as toilets, canteens for workers, water taps, safety 
equipment, and storage facilities for agricultural inputs and outputs, respectively) that require 
substantial financial capital to upgrade the farm. It also entails annual costs for external 
inspection by a certification body. Finally it requires that the producer know how to read, 
write, and keep records – which means a high level of human capital. Producers have two 
options to obtain certification under the standard: they can apply individually or apply 
collectively for a producer group certificate. Forming producer groups may reduce costs at 
various levels (lower cost for external inspection, shared investments…) (Asfaw et al., 2010; 
Belton et al., 2011; Narrod et al., 2009).  
Information on GlobalGap standard is relayed by government organizations, by producers 
and exporters’ organizations and NGOs. Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) have study the 
adoption of the Eurepgap standards in the mango export sector in Peru. According to their 
results conducted in 2004-2005, they show that the first major barrier to adoption is linked to 
the access to information on standard. Since exporting enterprises were the most informed 
actors, the adoption of the standard is mostly found in the activities of exporter enterprises by 
vertical integration. They highlight the risk of exclusion of certain producer groups. 
Concerning cost of compliance, our interviews’ results highlight a large variability of the 
costs of compliance, ranged between 150 and 833 US$/ha. This is influenced by the previous 
endowments in storage or other infrastructures and technical level of the farm, but also by the 
size of the farm (since infrastructure and technical level required are not size proportional). 
Some added costs are then spending for infrastructure maintenance. In spite of a large 
variability in their results, Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) calculate a cost of compliance of 
145 US$/ha/year on average and 9.51 US$/ton/year, i.e. 3,8% of the mango farm gate price. 
According to the producers’ perception, cost of implementation remains the major constraint 
from GlobalGap standard implementation.  
The fixed cost of annual inspection is 2000 $US/year. This cost is high, all the more 
without premium in the product price. Size of individual enterprise is thus a major 
determinant of the standard adoption. According to primary data, the minimum profitable size 
to implement GlobalGap is around 15 and 20 ha.  
Other problems of importance expresses by the interviewees are related to the high level of 
administrative forms required and therefore time required to fill the forms.  
Finally it is worthwhile to note that GlobalGap is weakly enforced and it is common that 
exporters mix certified production with uncertified production and sell it under the same 
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brand (Fulponi, 2007). Unfortunately GlobalGap figures are not available to compare surface 
certified and volume sold with GlobalGap standard. 
 
Organic production represents 1% of the total mango production in Peru (3,000 tons in 
2007). According to Promperu data from 2007, 36% of organic mangos are exported to the 
US and 64% to Europe (that is almost the same as the conventional mango market).  
Organic certification focuses on food-safety, environment quality, and traceability on the 
farm through agricultural practices that do not involve chemical inputs. The certificate 
includes few initial investments, but entails annual costs for external inspection by a 
certification body – meaning a minimum level of financial capital– and requires that the 
produce be able to read, write, and keep records – meaning again a minimum level of human 
capital. Again, producers have two options to obtain certification under the standard: they can 
apply individually or apply collectively for a producer group certificate.  
The cost of annual inspection is 2000 $US/year, but could be balance by the price premium 
of this certification and to the security of market access due to the product diversification 
(they highlight that organic product could sold in the both organic and conventional market). 
According to our interviews, the lower yield which is not always compensate by the premium 
is one of the major problem, above all due to neighboring effects (pest, …) when other 
farmers around are not taking care of their field.   
Organic farms are a majority of small farms. The market outlet is however quite small.  
 
3. Analytical framework and hypotheses 
 
a) An analytical framework 
Given the scarcity of an adequate amount of literature to analyze the implications that 
international sustainability standards have on the behavior of farmers, we propose to draw on 
the simple conceptual framework developed by Hirschman (1970), who analyzed the 
economic and political behavior of firms, organizations, and states facing a declining 
situation. Henson and Jaffee (2008) then used this framework in the specific case of food 
safety standards to analyze the strategic responses of developing countries. 
Hirschman compares strategic options by various organizations and describes strategy 
types through the concepts of “exit”, “loyalty”, and “voice” (Hirschman, 1970). The “voice” 
option involves complaining or negotiating through lobbying. Concerning food standards, 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) argue that “voice” could be understand as protesting again new 
standards, for example, at the WTO level when standards are judged unfair or as a 
protectionist barrier. The “loyalty” option involves the organization’s participation – this 
could be interpreted in the food sector as an alignment with the standard’s requirements 
(Henson and Jaffee, 2008). Lastly, the “exit” option involves ceasing participation – this 
could be interpreted in the food sector as choosing not to comply with the standard in a 
particular market, i.e. switching customers or particular markets if alternative profitable 
markets exist or, if no alternative is available, definitively stopping the activity. Moreover, 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) propose another dimension to Hirschman’s framework related to 
when option is implemented:  ex-ante “proactive” behaviors (anticipating standards) or ex-
post “reactive” behaviors (waiting and adapting). The most negative approach is thus a 
combination of “exit” and “reactive” behaviors. 
As Chemnitz et al, (2007) and Henson and Jaffee (2008) have already highlighted, the 
ability to implement the various options will depend on several factors at the country, market, 
and firm levels, as well as the specific food standards. 
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b) Specificity of the case study 
In our paper, we question the impacts of the restructuring of the mango supply chain by 
growing private standard requirements, GlobalGap in particular, on small-scale farmers. The 
farmers we surveyed are export-oriented (they grow the Kent variety, which is not valued 
locally), but may not be certified since they do not have enough land (they own less than 20 
ha). This research work offers a path for research that is not much developed in the literature: 
understanding the alternatives for small-scale farmers potentially excluded by stringent 
standards. 
 
We have to specify the above framework according to the relevant options for our case 
study. For instance, because we focus our analysis on small-scale farmers in Peru who are 
very fragmented and little organized, the “voice” option does not appear relevant and most of 
these smallholders have “reactive” behaviors. As Higgins et al. (2008) argue in their paper, in 
developing countries, farmers may be only “standard takers”(Higgins et al., 2008). We thus 
specify three main alternative options available to small-scale export-oriented farmers:  
(i) Loyalty:  As we mentioned above, producers have two options to obtain certification 
under the standard: either by applying individually or by applying collectively for a producer 
group certificate. In the case of small farmers who hold less than 20 ha, the loyalty strategy at 
the individual level seems difficult due to the fixed costs of compliance. The other option is 
thus that farmers organize themselves within producer organizations so as to comply 
collectively with standards. Yet the length of the mango harvest (three months) seriously 
limits the opportunities for the development of efficient collective action. According to the 
results of Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006), small-scale producers do not comply with 
GlobalGap certification. Khiem et al. (2010) have also show that this type of collective action 
for certification is not a panacea for farmers (Khiem et al., 2010). 
(ii) Switch9: Producers will continue to export to the EU and the US indifferently since 
they adopt organic certification. Organic certification substitutes for the GlobalGap 
requirement in the EU market.  
(iii) Exit: They will no longer export to the EU and will target the US or domestic markets 
instead. This means that the “auspicious” export window is reduced for these producers, 
perhaps implying that the farmers replace their usual exporter. In extreme cases, the farmers 
may uproot their Kent mango trees (intended for export) and replant new orchards with 
Edward or Criollo mango trees for the domestic market (targeting the higher segment of the 
domestic market).  
We must mention that non-certified producers do not yet face total exclusion from the EU 
market as a whole since EU importers can buy non-certified products when no GlobalGap 
produce is available. Consequently, some small-scale producers still have not chosen an 
option (later, they will be included in a control group named “continue”). Moreover, these 
alternatives are not totally exclusive, but we assume that the third is probably more frequent.  
Besides, the above analysis framework does not give any idea of the benefits or 
disadvantages for small farmers to adopt one type of marketing behavior. We will thus 
additionally formulate a research hypothesis on the impacts of these options on income and 
marketing risk for farmers.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 Contrary to Hirschman’s framework, in our particular case, we do not include switching customers in the exit 
option because “switching” here means to comply with another standard, which is related to an offensive 
strategy by farmers following the widespread use of GlobalGap certification.  
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c) Research hypotheses  
It may be necessary to introduce some hypotheses to test the impacts of marketing options 
on prices and marketing risks. We think that GlobalGap’s introduction may have ambiguous 
impacts on non-certified smallholders. 
First, when some small-scale producers choose the “loyalty” option (i.e. compliance with 
the GlobalGap standard), one could expect positive results on income and marketing stability: 
(iv) Price and Stability: GlobalGap certification does not involve the price premium, but 
since it could increase market access when the EU export market is favorable, we expect 
prices to increase. Besides, since GlobalGap compliance often leads to stronger vertical 
coordination through farming contracts, we expect producer-exporter relationship stability to 
increase. 
Second, the “switch” option may have positive results on the income and marketing 
stability for small-scale producers: 
(v) Price and Stability: Organic certification involves the price premium, which could 
balance the costs of compliance. It could also increase the security of market access due to 
product diversification. Consequently, we expect price and market stability to increase. 
Third, the “exit” option may have negative results on the income and marketing stability of 
non-certified smallholders:  
(vi) Price: Non-certified producers switch to supplying the domestic market, where the 
price for Kent mangos is substantially lower than on the international market.  
(vii) Risk: Non-certified producers switch to supplying “golondrinos” (unknown buyers). 
This is likely to increase their marketing risk (unstable relationships, low prices, etc.). 
However, the demand for certified products may have indirect positive results on the 
income of non-certified producers:  
(viii) Price: Conventional product demand from the US may mostly be satisfied by the 
supply chain responses of non-certified producers. In addition, the bargaining power of these 
producers compared to small-scale exporters, such as golondrinos, may increase.  
Consequently, we could expect non-certified producer prices to increase.  
(ix) Hired labor: According to SOMO (2011), the increase in certified exporters’ own 
production increases the need for hired labor (SOMO, 2011). Consequently, we could expect 
a higher labor demand at the village level. 
(x) Income: The increase of price for conventional mangos and the increase of hired labor 
may increase the total income of non-certified producers. 
 
The following sections examine various options for small scale farmers presented in the 
conceptual framework described above in the context of rising GG demand in the export 
supply chain in Peru.  
 
4. Survey and data 
 
a) Survey and method 
This empirical study was led in the framework of the EU NTM-Impact Project (www.ntm-
impact.eu), whose objectives include the analysis of the impacts of non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) from high-income countries – governmental regulations and private standards – on 
developing countries.  
Between October 2010 and May 2011, we undertook a survey of 223 mango producers in 
the main mango region of Piura, where over 90% of exported mangos originate. We focus our 
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analysis here on small farmers with less than 20 ha and who represent 20-30% of mango 
exports and 70-80% of all mango producers. We randomly selected 19 villages located in the 
two main areas where exporters’ plants are found – Sullana and Tambogrande10. Within these 
villages, producer surveys were chosen randomly among the farmers growing Kent mangos 
(i.e. export-oriented) with holdings of less than 20 ha (i.e. small farmers for whom individual 
GlobalGap certification might be unprofitable). Surveys were conducted on a face-to-face 
basis. The data collected through the questionnaire include: farm and household general 
characteristics, household assets, mango production and marketing behavior, mango standard 
certifications (organic and GlobalGap), other activities, changes and perceptions since 
GlobalGap is required by exporters. According to the surveys, producers no longer know 
where their mangos are exported to because large exporters generally export to both markets. 
The producer does not choose an export target, but rather an exporter.  
 
In addition, exporters interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire were done to 
collect supplemental contextual data from 10 exporters. Finally, this primary data were 
supplemented with information of prices. 
 
b) Data analysis 
To describe the sample of producers, descriptive statistics are applied. To describe factors 
that may have influenced the farmers’ marketing behaviors and determined perceived impacts 
of standard requirements, an analysis is performed using t-test and Chi²-test11. In this paper, 
we do not show a causal effect of GlobalGap certification on producers, but rather we depict 
the characteristics and perceptions that characterize the different types of producers in the 
alternative options.  
Finally, estimating a regression model tests the hypothesis concerning the impact of these 
options on the price received for mangos. In addition, we also control for other factors 
considered to be relevant, such as the variables of farm and household characteristics and 
relationships with buyers.  The dependant variable of the regression is the logarithm of the 
highest price received by the farmer (figure 4). We do not know the volume sold at this price, 
but since farmers generally harvest once or twice per season and that the discarded mangos 
could not have received the highest price, we can assume that it was a sizeable amount of the 
farmer’s production. We think that it could be a good proxy of the producer’s bargaining 
power and final income (given the volume of mangos). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 We choose to not take into account the Chulucanas area since an NGO works actively with small farmers to 
participate into the high standard markets (Fair Trade, Organic and GlobalGap). This may has biased our results 
by the exogenous intervention.  
11
 We cannot use a multivariate logistic regression model because alternative options are not totally exclusive. 
 Figure 4: distribution of the dependent variable:  logarithm of the higher price received 
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have increased their volumes sold to unknown traders since 2007 (29% have decreased and 
35% have experienced no change). Unknown traders are generally golondrinos12, i.e. 
exporters with a very volatile existence. We already know that most producers (85%) work 
with unknown traders each year, particularly to sell any Kent mangos rejected by their usual 
exporters. 34% of producers declare selling low volumes to these traders and 42% of 
producers declare selling a high volume to these traders each year. 56% of producers who 
declare huge volumes to unknown traders say that these volumes have increased since 2007 – 
the latter (24% of the total sample) are considered among the “exit” option below because 
they no longer know to whom they are selling their mangos. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
While it appears not appropriate to analyze “voice” strategy at the producer level, it is 
worthwhile to mention as an element of context that, at the national level, Peru adopted the 
voice strategy. Indeed, in 2007, various developing countries, including Peru, complained at 
the WTO against the “untransparency” of private standards because these standards are not 
based on science and not even notified to the WTO. This “voice” strategy at the national level 
didn’t give any results, letting Peruvian producers to reactive strategy of “loyalty”, “switch” 
or “exit”. 
 
Chi²-test and t-test procedures are used for comparison on the table 5 and table 6. 
 
At the producer level, thanks to our empirical data, we compare the three options proposed 
above: loyalty (GlobalGap adopters), switch (organic adopters) and exit (selling mangos to 
unknown traders) behavior categories according to some selected variables.  
 
As presented in Table 5, the average total land size of GlobalGap adopters (loyalty) is 
significantly lower than the control group (continue). Yet similar to organic adopters (switch), 
the farmers are significantly more specialized in mango production (ratio of land size under 
mango are statistically significant below 0.05 level of probability). Regarding yield, there are 
no significant differences among the groups – the lower yield expected for organic farming is 
not significant. Regarding the exit option, the average size of total land is a little lower than 
their counterparts and these producers have a little less mango production (variables are 
statistically significant below 0.1 level of probability).  
Household characteristics do not show any important results in terms of our comparison, 
except that farmer adopting organic standard are a little younger (that seems also explain that 
they have a few years of less experience) and GlobalGap adopters and exit producers are more 
likely to have income from an agricultural off-farm activity - below 0.05 level of probability. 
This could be explained in different ways: while it is proof of GlobalGap adopters’ access to 
financial capital that could be reinvested in their farms, conversely in this case of exit 
producers this could suggest that their farm is not profitable enough to bring sufficient 
income. They are also less likely to own a car. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 This is less likely to be a new broker for the domestic market, which does not present a profitable opportunity 
for the Kent variety. In addition, in the domestic market, producers are used to working with the same broker, 
often a relative. 
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Table 5: Mean comparison of producer characteristics according to alternative options 
 
Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
 
a
 Continue is the control group (i.e. the total sample without standard adopters and producers who declare 
huge volume to unknown traders and said that this volume has increased since 2007). 
 
Among variables related to market access, the distance is significantly lower for standard 
adopters - below 0.01 and 0.05 level of probability for respectively GlobalGap and organic 
adopters.. This could suggest that standard compliance may be more the result of an 
exporter’s decision rather than that of the farmer. This could be supported by the fact that it is 
the exporters who manage the harvest inside the mango farms. Other variables related to 
relationships with buyers, such as contracts (used to having written contracts or not) and 
advance payments, differ significantly - below 0.01 and 0.05 level of probability for 
 Continuea 
(n=137) 
Loyalty 
(Globlgap) 
(n= 18) 
Switch 
(Organic) 
(n=28) 
Exit  
(Do not know anymore 
their buyer) 
(n=49) 
Farm characteristics     
Total land size 8,81 4,2*** 6,8 7,18* 
Ratio of land size under 
mangos  
0,52 0,82*** 0,65** 0,53 
Ratio of mango area under 
Kent 
0,84 0,88 0,87 0,84 
Volume of mangos 2009 16,96 10,4* 10,71* 12,48* 
Yield 2009 8,00 8,34 6,69 7,47 
Household characteristics 
Age  55,6 51,4* 51,3** 57,7 
Education 1,49 1,61 1,46 1,48 
Experience 15,77 14,4 12,96** 15,57 
Children  (<15 years)  1,67 1,5 1,70 1,43 
Mobile phone 0,64 0,77 0,64 0,65 
Car 0,27 0,16 0,18 0,12** 
Date of car 1995 2004* 2002* 1991 
Agri. off farm Income  0,08 0,33*** 0,14 0,20** 
Market access and relation w/ buyer 
Distance to plant 14,9 7,8*** 11,5** 14,4 
Packing plant 0,68 0,94** 0,68 0,84** 
Works only w/ 1 exporter 0,71 0,88* 0,73 0,37 
Used to have written contract 0,15 0,66*** 0,43*** 0,02** 
Used to have no contract 0,57 0,27*** 0,39** 0,77*** 
Technical advices 0,5 0,77*** 0,5 0,02*** 
Advance payment 0,18 0,44*** 0,28* 0,04** 
Month is important for buyer 0,27 0,22 0,14 0,39** 
Color is important for buyer 0,49 1*** 0,90*** 0,44* 
Weight is important for buyer 0,51 1*** 0,85*** 0,51 
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respectively GlobalGap and organic adopters.. Written contracts and advance payments attest 
to close relationships with the buyers. In the case of GlobalGap adopters, farmers are also 
more likely to receive technical advice from the buyer and the presence of nearby packing 
plant (namely exclusively EU-oriented) is significantly higher compared to the control group. 
The results lead to the same conclusion as Kleinwechter and Grethe, who have shown that 
vertical integration or some forms of vertical coordination, such as contract farming, can be 
seen as the most important factor influencing GlobalGap compliance (Kleinwechter and 
Grethe, 2006 ). Moreover, standard adopters’ buyers are significantly more demanding in 
terms of commercial quality (color and weight) than those of their counterparts. Finally, exit 
producers have significantly less contracts with buyers (below 0.01 level of probability); they 
do not benefit from technical advice or advance payments, even if a packing plant is generally 
and significantly more accessible for them than for the control group. For the exit option, 
buyers are more demanding on the month of the available production, suggesting that the 
buyers have shortened export windows.  
 
Table 6: Mean comparison of producer perceptions according to alternative options 
 
 Continue 
(n=137) 
Loyalty 
(Globlgap) 
(n= 18) 
Switch 
(Organic) 
(n=28) 
Exit 
(Don’t know anymore 
their buyer) 
(n=49) 
Risks and stability in market access 
Production costs have increased 0,60 0,72 0,75 0,67 
Production costs have decreased 0 0 0 0,12*** 
Price risk has increased 0,66 0,66 0,50** 0,82** 
Price risk has decreased 0,15 0,11 0,28* 0,14 
Stability of relation w/ buyer has 
increased 
0,32 0,50** 0,43* 0,14** 
Stability of relation w/ buyer has 
decreased 
0,25 0,05** 0,25 0,37 
Increased land under Kent 0,21 0,11 0,14 0,20 
Increased land under cereals 0,22 0*** 0*** 0,35* 
Increased land under fruit trees 0,36 0,61* 0,39 0,47 
Increased land under cocoa 0,02 0,44*** 0,21*** 0 
Income and bargaining power 
Off farm labor has increased 0,07 0,16* 0,21*** 0** 
Off farm labor has decreased 0,18 0,05 0,18 0,12 
Mango prices have increased  0,37 0,55 0,57* 0,40 
Mango prices have decreased 0,32 0,22 0,21 0,34 
Earlier payment 0,24 0,38 0,14 0,24 
Later payment 0,33 0,05** 0,28 0,24 
Bargaining power has increased 0,26 0,33 0,32 0,08*** 
Bargaining power has decreased 0,31 0*** 0,17** 0,53*** 
Income has increased 0,34 0,55** 0,43 0,22 
Income has decreased 0,30 0,16 0,32 0,48** 
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Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
 
From Table 6, which summarized the farmers’ perceptions of changes since GlobalGap has 
been required by large exporters (2007), the perception of farmers regarding production costs 
do not show any significant differences between option categories: 60% to 75% of producers 
declare that production costs have increased. However, within the exit option group, a 
significant number of producers (12%) declare that production costs have decreased. The 
higher production costs expected for GlobalGap and organic farming are thus not significant. 
On the contrary, the perception of price risk and the stability of buyer relationships show stark 
differences: while a significant number of organic producers declare that price risk has 
decreased or at least not increased, GlobalGap producers insist on the heightened stability of 
their buyer relationships (variables are statistically significant below 0.05 level of 
probability). For the exit option group, both indicators of price risk and stability have 
deteriorated since 2007. 
According to the categories, 11% to 21% of producers have increased the amount of land 
dedicated to mangos, particularly the Kent variety13. Nonetheless, there is no significant 
difference between the categories. In addition, none of the producers have decreased their 
land allotments for mangos (i.e. uprooted mango trees). These results suggest that, for the 
moment, none of the producers tend to exit from the mango production activity. Since mango 
trees represent an investment, we could easily understand why producers do not react 
promptly to the market signals. Switching costs are high. In addition, both standard adopters 
are more likely to increase their land allotments for cocoa (statistically significant below 0.01 
level of probability) than the control group, and inversely the land for cereals. Cereals are 
annual crops for the national market. Prices vary, but farmers can switch crops yearly. Fruit 
trees (mainly lemon trees but also maracuya) mentioned by the producers surveyed are 
planted to sell the production on the domestic market. They represent an investment for 
farmers (trees do not produce the first years), but prices on the local market are more secure 
than on the international one. Cocoa trees represent an investment for farmers and the 
production is sold exclusively on the international market, generally allowing for better 
prices, but also higher marketing risks. Therefore, the result suggests that standard adopters 
are less risk-averse than the non-adopters14. With regards to the exit option, farmers have been 
more likely to grow cereals since 2007, which illustrates a defensive strategy.  
Among the variables related to income and bargaining power, standard adopters are more 
likely to declare that off-farm labor has increased - below 0.01 and 0.1 level of probability for 
respectively organic and GlobalGap adopters.. When looking at the qualitative answers for the 
kind of job they have adopted, they declare to have small shops. Increasing off-farm labor 
may thus reflect a better financial situation for these farmers, as they were able to invest in the 
shop, rather than a pessimistic one (looking for extra income outside of an unprofitable farm). 
                                                 
13
 While producers have increased land allotments for mangos since 2007, it is always with the Kent variety and 
never with other domestic market varieties (Criollo or Edward).  
14
 Since cereals may require more land than fruit trees or cocoa to be profitable, we control that the land size area 
available for other crops in the farm was not a limiting factor for standard adopters to increase land allotments 
for cereals. 
Working conditions 
Labor has increased 0,49 0,77** 0,86*** 0,63* 
Labor has decreased 0,021 0 0,01 0 
Working conditions are improved 0,26 0,72*** 0,50*** 0,14* 
Working conditions are 
deteriorated  
0,19 0*** 0*** 0,42*** 
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For the exit option group, off-farm labor has not increased. Our hypothesis that certified 
exporters are more likely to increase their need for hired labor and thus the demand for labor 
at the village level (according to the results of SOMO, 2011) does not concern hired labor 
from the exit option group. Since labor contracts are for only three months, the mango 
season’s peak, we can think that the seasonal workers are thus generally not mango producers 
themselves. Organic farmers are more likely to declare that mango prices have increased 
(57% of them) since GlobalGap farmers a large number of them declare that their income has 
increased and that they do not receive later payment for that. In addition, both standard 
adopter categories perceive that their bargaining power has not decreased since 2007, while 
their counterparts dramatically perceive a decrease of their bargaining power. Lastly, among 
the variables related to working conditions, both standard adopter categories declare that the 
labor has increased in their farm since they have complied with the standard. However, their 
working conditions have also significantly improved. Actually, mango production is low 
labor-intensive. Yet because they comply with the standards, farmers have increased their 
labor time on the farm, mostly because they have to keep records of all their farm practices. 
On the contrary, exit option producers declare that their working conditions have deteriorated 
on the farm.  
 
To further investigate how the bargaining power of farmers is affected by the certification, 
we estimate a simple regression on the level of the highest price received by farmers in 2009 
for Kent mangos (Table 7)15. According to the results of our model, the loyalty option 
(GlobalGap adopters) is positively and strongly related to receiving a better price for mangos, 
corroborating our hypothesis. We cannot conclude that the causality of certification on the 
price level16, but the result can suggest that if there is no price premium included in 
GlobalGap compliance, certified farmers have better access to the market when the price is 
high and the supply is highly competitive. In the same way, the coefficient for the switch 
option (organic certification) shows that produced received a significantly better price, 
corroborating the fact that organic certification generally includes a price premium from the 
buyer. According to our initial hypothesis, the exit option (non-certified producers who no 
longer know their buyers) may have ambiguous effects on the price: from the Table 3 results, 
none of the hypotheses (positive or negative impacts on the price) are actually verified. 
Among the other statistically significant variables in our model, the total volume of mangos 
sold in 2009 is positively correlated to a higher price, as we could expect since the volume 
also determined the bargaining power of farmers with traders. The month of the mango 
harvest is also important in determining the price received. Consequently, producers for 
whom harvests mostly take place in January are more likely to receive a lower price. 
Otherwise, we find no evidence that having more experience, getting a car or a mobile phone 
– this could increase farmer bargaining power through better access to information —
improves the prices received by farmers. Moreover, the fact that a treatment plant (i.e. easier 
exporter access to both the US and EU markets) is the most available plant for the farmer does 
not influence the price received for mangos. And finally, to be paid earlier does not damage 
the bargaining power of farmers.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Unlike controlled experiments, conditions other than standard adoption are not equal in our farm surveys. 
Thus received a better price for farmer cannot necessarily be attributed to the adoption of one of the standards. 
16
 We have no latent variables to control whether the price is due to the new certification or to the fact that this 
group of producers may have been initially more efficient. 
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Table 7: Regression estimation results 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the gap in the literature regarding the implications that international 
sustainability standards have on the behavior of (potentially) excluded farmers and their 
impacts in terms of marketing risks and income levels. Drawing on the adapted concepts of 
Hirschman (1970), we have used this analytical framework to compare alternative options that 
mango producers in Peru have been progressively following since GlobalGap exporter 
requirements are growing.  
Data collected through a representative and large number of surveys with small-scale 
export-oriented producers (223 surveys) shows three main options -statistically 
distinguishable- adopted by these farmers. First, and contrary to the findings of Kleinwechter 
and Grethe (2006), we show evidence that the loyalty option exists since 8% of our sample 
are complying with GlobalGap. Exporting companies thus support these farmers in complying 
with the standard through farming contracts, technical advice, and by paying the annual 
certification costs. This kind of farming contract with smallholders have been described in 
others cases (Asfaw et al., 2007; Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Minten et al., 2009). This support 
allows small-scale producers to be included in the lucrative international market. According to 
the results of the Chi²-test and t-test procedures used for option comparison, these farmers are 
more likely to declare having a increasing stability of their relationship with their buyer, an 
increasing income and better working conditions since 2007. In addition, the results of the 
regression on the level of the higher price received by farmers in 2009 for mangos Kent, show 
that these farmers received a significatively better price for mangos. Therefore, while exporter 
companies GlobalGap certified tend to increase vertical integration of the mango production, 
it still exist a mixed picture of their mango supply, thanks to contract farming allowing the 
Dependant variable: log. of highest price for mango in 
2009 
Coeff. Std. dev. 
Alternative options 
Loyalty 0.205*** 0.080 
Switch 0.123** 0.064 
Exit - 0.156 0.049 
Farm characteristics 
Volume of mangos 2009 0.002** 0.001 
Production peak in December - 0.005 0.042 
Production peak in January - 0.119*** 0.049 
Household characteristics 
Experience -0.002 0.002 
Mobile phone 0.045 0.044 
Car 0.067 0.050 
Market access and relation w/ buyer 
Packing plant 0.042 0.049 
Risks and stability in market access 
Earlier payment -0.057 0.047 
Constant 2.382*** 0.141 
Pseudo-R² 0.17  
N 207  
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integration of small-scale farmers into the high standard market. Nonetheless, farmers who 
are integrating into this supply chain seem to be selected according to two characteristics: 
they are more specialized in mango production (more than 80% of their land) and they are 
closer to the exporter plant. Exporters may thus decrease transaction costs by selecting 
productive farmers close to their plant. Second, we found farmers who adopt another option 
(switch option) to bypass the difficulties of complying with GlobalGap certification by 
implementing organic certification. Organic certification, which required less initial 
investment from farmers, substitutes for the GlobalGap requirement in the EU market. 
According to the mean comparisons, these farmers are more likely to perceive that price risk 
has decreased and that their working conditions have been improved. The regression 
estimation show that they also received a rather better price for mangos, as expected. These 
farmers are also rather specialized in mango production (65% of their land area), they are 
quite close to the plant and have also contract farming. Third, we found a steady number of 
farmers who declare that they no longer know their mango buyers. These buyers are the well-
known golondrinos, which represent 30% to 50% of the exporter companies and are very 
volatile. Farmers belonging to this option group seem to be very affected by this change: a 
large majority (82%) declares that price risk has increased, that stability with farmers has 
rather not increased (compared to their counterparts), their bargaining power and their 
agricultural income have decreased, and last that their working conditions have deteriorated. 
They are particularly vulnerable because their level of investment (mango trees) impedes to 
radically change of farm activity. Switching costs are high. These farmers – characterized by 
rather low total land size, low mango volume, and never used to getting any contract farming, 
technical advice, or advance payments – represent 24% of our total sample.  
This study aimed to contribute to the analysis of the extent to which small-scale farmers 
are affected by non-certification and thus how problematic such forms of exclusion are. The 
latter is of interest to policymakers since Peruvian agriculture is still source of economic 
development and represents a large source of employment. We show in this case study a 
significant level of exit option (which is more an exit of the stable usual supply chain than a 
definite market exit). Consequences of growing international standards in different 
agricultural sectors are thus very important to analyze in order to develop adapted policy 
recommendations and support for farmers. The question is however whether policymakers 
can do anything to facilitate smallholders to comply with new sustainable standards? The 
success story of Kenya (Jaffee and Henson, 2004) could allow highlighting some interesting 
key points in particular with the development of the public guidelines for good agricultural 
practices by product and the definition of clear direction of programmes of technical 
assistance and support for small-scale farmers. 
 
Finally, to pursue this analysis it would be interesting to better understand why some 
farmers (the “continue” control group) are still not affected by the international standard 
requirements, without any changes to their way of supplying exporters. It would thus be 
necessary to interview their specific exporters. As mention by Belton et al. (2011) some small 
operators may continue as best they can to cater for markets at midterm but they face 
increased vulnerability due to reduced market share. Otherwise, this could be due to the lack 
of GlobalGap enforcement, since it is known that some exporters mix certified production 
with uncertified production and sell it under the same brand (Fulponi, 2007). Unfortunately, it 
is difficult to get GlobalGap figures to compare the surface certified and the volume sold with 
the global standard.  
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Appendixes: 
 
Appendix 1: Evolution of Peruvian mangoes exports in EU and US (quantity and valor) 
since 2000 
 
 
 
Source: COMTRADE, 2010 
 
 
Appendix 2:  Export of Peruvian mangoes in the world in 2010 
 
 
Source: SENASA, 2010 
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 Appendix 3:  Evolution of Peruvian mangoes price in EU and US since 2000
 
Source: COMTRADE, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: characteristics of the 4 types of exporting companies
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